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SOCIAL DESIRABILITY OF SAFETY-RELATED RESEARCH
JOINT VENTURES: EFFECT OF TORT LIABILITY ON THE
SOCIAL WELFARE CALCULATION
by Debbie L. Moeckler*
I. Introduction
Consumers are increasingly concerned about the environmental
costs that they and society will
have to pay for hazardous side-effects from the production or disposal of consumer products.
Therefore, the safe, proper disposal of hazardous waste has become
an issue of ever-increasing concern. In addressing this concern, a
wide variety of state, local, and
federal legislation has been enacted. However, this legislation has
been largely ineffective because the
present legislation focuses on implementing legal remedies after the
waste has already been disposed.'
The current legal framework
should be reformed by changing
the focus of the legislation from
post-disposal remedies to pre-production and pre-disposal remedies.' Accordingly, new methods
for addressing the production and
disposal of hazardous waste need
to be developed. In particular,
there are a number of ways to
create incentives that would
achieve the desired level of research safety innovations involving the production and disposal of
hazardous waste. One potential
method for realizing the socially
optimal level of research safety
innovations is to encourage research joint ventures ("RJVs") between industry members that
would result in the necessary safety
research.
This Article analyzes the social
desirability of using RJVs in high
technology fields, such as hazardous waste management, to stimulate the socially optimal level of
safety innovation. This analysis
will help consumers understand
some of the necessary incentives
that might ultimately cause companies to develop safe processes
that minimize the production of
hazardous waste. Section II will set
forth an overview of basic concepts
of social welfare economics. Sec16

tion III will describe the expected
effects on social welfare that result
from a research joint venture, examining both the efficiency gains
and competitive losses associated
with RJVs. The traditional methods of analyzing the costs and
benefits of joint ventures are explained. In addition, this section
will discuss the factors that determine the expected weight of each
element in the social welfare calculation. Section IV will discuss why
the tort system must be accounted
for in the social welfare calculation
given its effect on the level of safety
innovation. Finally, this Article

The tort system must be
accounted for in the social
welfare calculation.
advocates that traditional methods
of analyzing research joint ventures need to be reexamined in
light of the effects of the legal
system's tort liability rules on the
social welfare calculation.
II. Social Welfare Economics
Because all resources in society
are limited, including those devoted to research, society must determine how to allocate its resources.
In particular, society must decide
what goods and services to produce, how much to produce of each
good and service, and how to distribute the goods and services to
consumers.
Social welfare economics provides society with a method to
determine how best to allocate its
resources in the production of
goods and services for consumers.
Specifically, social welfare economics provides society with a way
to distribute its resources efficiently. Measurable units of allocation
and production include land, labor, raw materials and capital.
Efficiency occurs by maximizing
the benefits to society while mini-

mizing the costs to society. This
efficient level of allocation and
production is referred to as the
socially optimal or socially desirable level. Social welfare is maximized when the benefit of one
additional unit, the marginal social
benefit, equals the cost of one
additional unit, the marginal social
cost. Determining the socially desirable level is often accomplished
by using a social welfare calculation that is based on a formula that
weighs costs and benefits.
Individual firms, in seeking to
maximize profit, undertake the
same decision making process as
society. A firm will produce a
particular product at the most efficient level when the firm's marginal cost equals the firm's marginal
benefit, and therefore maximizes
the firm's profit. In a perfectly
functioning market, society will
reach its optimal level through the
choices of individual firms. In other words, in a perfect market,
social marginal benefit equals the
firm's marginal benefit and social
marginal cost equals the firm's
marginal cost. Therefore, as firms
maximize their individual profit,
social benefit will also be maximized.
However, there are often impediments that prevent the market
from functioning perfectly. These
impediments include transaction
costs, i.e., the human time costs
that are exclusive of the price of the
item exchanged. Another impediment occurs when some of the
costs of consumption or production are borne by others. These
third party effects are called externalities. Additionally, there are
some goods and services, called
public goods, that society must
*DebbieL. Moeckler is an associate
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provide to its citizens, even if the
citizens do not pay for these goods
and services. A firm may not have
the proper incentive to provide
public goods because the firm is
unable to recoup its costs of production from consumers.
In an imperfect market, social
marginal cost does not necessarily
equal a firm's marginal cost and
social marginal benefit may not
equal a firm's marginal benefit. As
a result, even if a firm were to
produce at its individually efficient
level, social benefit may not be
maximized. This phenomenon appears to occur in the production of
safety related research, as discussed in detail in Section III.
Because society is not producing
its efficient level of safety related
research solely through the working of the free market, the government may need to cure these market defects.
The use of joint ventures for
safety research innovation may
provide a potential cure for the
inefficiencies and defects in the
market without the need for government regulation. A joint venture is a cooperative effort where
firms pool their resources together
to develop a particular end prod-

Joint ventures for safety
research innovation may
provide a potential cure for
the inefficiencies and defects
in the market.
uct. For example, in a research
joint venture, firms pool their research-related resources to conduct
research on a particular subject of
interest to the firms.
Ill. Potential Welfare Effects That
Influence the Social Desirability of
Joint Ventures
Several scholars have reviewed
the potential effects on social welfare that result from RJVs.3 The
traditional methods 4 for evaluating
RJV's focus on the economic effects absent a RJV. In certain
instances, gains to efficiency may
be realized by using a joint venture
to conduct research and development ("R & D"). In other instances, a RJV may cause decreases in
Volume 4 Number l/Fall, 1991

competition. This Section will examine the gains in efficiency and
the decreases in competition that
may result from RJVs. Each factor
that creates efficiency gains or creates competitive losses will be analyzed and applied to the social
welfare calculation.
A. Efficiency Gains
There are at least three broad
areas where social benefits may be
increased by the cooperative R &
D effort of a RJV as compared to
non-cooperative research effort:
(1) ex ante (pre-research) incentives to encourage the proper level
of research, (2) economies of joint
research that lower the costs of the
project, resulting in gains from
combining individual assets that
cannot be achieved individually;
and (3) ex post (post-research) dissemination of results, ensuring that
after the research has been completed the results are distributed
efficiently. 5
1. Pre-research incentives that may
result in too little research: the
spillover effect
A spillover occurs when a firm's
research results are used by other
firms who either pay nothing to the
firm who conducted the research
or at a minimum do not pay the
researching firm an amount equal
to the benefit received from the use
of the research. Therefore, the benefits of the firm's research spill
over to other firms.
When a firm conducting research is unable to charge the other
firms proportionately for their use
of the R & D either before or after
completing the research, the other
firms can unfairly benefit from the
researching firm's investment. Because the researching firm is not
able to recoup the full benefit of its
investment, the firm has incentive
to invest in a socially sub-optimal
level of research. The firm's incentive to invest in R & D will be
further diminished because not only does the firm receive less than
the full return on its investment
but its competitors are receiving
the benefits of the research at a
bargain price.
In theory, under a perfect system
of property rights, the owner of the
research would be able to charge

the users for the full cost of the
completed research. Because the
researching firm would receive the
full return on its investment, the
firm would invest in the socially
optimal level of research. However, the current system of property
rights is not perfect. For example,
under the patent system, not all
6
research results are patentable.
Although intangible assets, such as
a process, are patentable, the more
intangible a property is, the more
unlikely that the owner will be able
to show its novelty and utility,
which are requirements for a patent.7 Furthermore, even if the
results were patentable, undetected
infringement of the patent may
still occur. Given these imperfections of the property system, a firm
will be unable to recover the full
cost of the completed research
from the firm's competitors that
use the research.
Even if the current property
system was perfect and allowed
each research firm to charge firms
using the research an amount equal
to the benefit received, the current
property system may still not afford the optimal solution. Although the property system,
through patents or other mechanisms, may effectively decrease the
effects of spillovers by forcing
firms to pay for the research, the
system may also cause a decrease
in the dissemination of information gained by the research. This
decrease would occur as firms realized that the dissemination of their
own patented research efforts
would help their competitors improve. As a result, the gains to
efficiency resulting from the dissemination of research are reduced
because firms will not desire to
help their competitors improve.8
The spillover or free rider problem may be eliminated through the
use of RJVs. Under a joint venture
scheme, the participating firms are
forced to pay the full price of
research because the firms agree
ahead of time to split the costs of
the research. As a result, the participating firms will be encouraged to
invest at the socially desirable level
of research because each firm
would reap the appropriate return
on its investment.
(continued on page 18)
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However, if all of the potential
participants do not join the venture, the spillover effect may not be
completely eliminated. Some firms
may decline to participate in the
venture because they intend to
utilize the benefits of the joint
venture later without having to pay
for the initial cost of the venture. If

good, such as information, the firm
will receive little, if any, protection
from the patent system. Accordingly, because of the difficulty in
establishing any sort of property
right over information, the free
rider problem will be the greatest
when the firm is conducting research where the end product is
information. 9 Therefore, a joint
research venture should result in
the greatest gains to social welfare
- by eliminating or reducing the
free rider problem - when the

Participating firms will be
encouraged to invest at the
socially desirable level of
research because each firm
would reap the appropriate
return on its investment.
these non-participating firms are
indeed able to benefit from the
efforts of the joint venture, then
the research costs are not completely shared by all of the beneficiaries of the research. Accordingly, firms have less incentive to
participate in the joint venture.
The single largest factor that
influences how great the spillover
effect will be - and hence how
much benefit can be derived from
a cooperative effort - is the product of the joint venture. The magnitude of the spillover effect is tied
to the end product of the investment because the property system
affords differing degrees of protection to different types of products.
Accordingly, if the firm is conducting research into innovations of
end products, the firm will be able
to protect most, if not all, of its
investment through the patent system by patenting the processes or
products developed. The firm will
be able to charge other firms an
amount equal to the benefit received from using its patented processes or products. To the extent
that the investing firm can charge
the other firms for use of the results
from its investment, the firm is
forcing the other firms to pay the
cost of the investment. As a result,
the current property system provides the most protection when the
product is a tangible good.
On the other hand, if the result
of the research is an intangible
18

joint venture is conducting basic
research where the end product of
the research is information.' 0
2. Economies ofjoint research
Cooperative research allows
firms to achieve the same results at
lower costs because the participating firms are able to: (1) reduce
duplication of research effort; (2)
achieve economies of scale; (3)
realize synergies by combining
complementary assets; and (4) pool
the risks associated with research.
a. Reducing the duplication of
research effort
A joint venture reduces the duplication of the research effort.
Absent a joint venture, each firm
would have to conduct all the
preliminary or fundamental experiments independently. However,
with the joint venture these parallel experiments only have to be
conducted once. As a result, the
joint venture conducts this research more efficiently because the
same results are achieved at a
lower price. These savings are especially important when the resources, such as scientists, are
scarce.
The degree of competition in the
industry will affect the magnitude
of the efficiency gains that result
from reducing duplicative research. In particular, "in highly
competitive industries where each
firm's capital is needed merely to
compete and cannot be invested in
extended R & D projects, duplication of research efforts must be
avoided."" Accordingly, the greatest efficiency gains from reducing
the duplication of research are expected when dealing with highly
competitive industries.
However, the magnitude of effi-

ciency gains that result from reducing duplicative research may not
be as great as generally expected
because the saving of resources is
only one of the consequences of
combining preliminary research.
Eliminating independent experiments may have negative effects as
well. First, the results from each
firm conducting parallel experiments may not be identical. Even if
the results are identical, scientists
may react differently to the results
and follow different paths based on
the results. This creativity may
lead to greater research gains.
Thus, when the number of independent experiments is reduced,
the potential for creativity gains is
also reduced. The loss of creativity
that results from reducing the
number of individual participants
is a12potential downside of synergistic gains that may result from
RJVs.
While the loss of creativity may
reduce the extent of the benefit
realized from decreasing the duplication of research efforts, on balance the benefits realized should
outweigh the losses. However, if
the effect of the loss of creativity is
great enough, the overall effect of
the joint venture on social welfare
may be negligible.
b. Economies of scale
A joint venture may enable the
participants to achieve economies
of scale that any one of the firms
acting independently would be unable to realize. In some instances,
the minimal investment for a particular type of research may be too
large relative to the size of the firm.
For example, some very sophisticated research may require elaborate laboratory facilities or expensive pieces of research equipment.
A joint venture may enable smaller
firms to take advantage of investment opportunities that otherwise
would be unprofitable. Therefore,
a RJV may remove some of the
financial disincentives that prevent small firms from conducting
expensive research projects. The
greatest gains from generating
economies of scale are likely to
occur in high technology industries, such as hazardous waste
management, where sophisticated
labs and equipment are essential
Volume 4 Number I/Fall, 1991
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elements for productive research.
c. Synergies
During a joint venture, the participants may experience efficiency
gains that result from synergy. Synergy occurs when the output from
assets that are used in combination
is greater than the aggregate output
of the same assets used individually. As part of the joint venture,
individual firms combine assets
and resources with other firms. If
the individual firms have assets
that are unique or complementary
to the other participant firms' assets, then the combination of assets
may produce synergistic gains. Because the combination of assets
produces greater results from the
same amount of investment, the
joint venture is more efficient than
the sum of the individual acts of
the venture participants.
Synergistic gains are most likely
to occur when the venture participants are from different industries
or different niches of the same
industry.' 3 As the similarity among
joint venture participants decreases, the probability of having
unique or complimentary assets
increases. Furthermore, participants from different areas may
have adopted different approaches
to deal with the same or similar
problems.
d. Risk pooling
When firms are involved in
risky investments, with little or no
actual return, a joint venture may
allow the participants to create a
portfolio of investments to help
diversify away some of the risks.
Diversification is extremely desirable when investments consist of
research projects because research
projects tend to be highly risky
ventures for several reasons. First,
the completion of the project remains uncertain because many
projects result in dead ends. Second, even when a project is completed, the firm may be unable to
recoup any or all of its investment.
The same or similar results may
have already been discovered by a
competitor who has appropriated
all the value of that discovery
through a variety of mechanisms,
such as the patent system.' 4 If the
firm is prevented from recovering
Volume 4 Number I/Fall, 1991

its investment, the value of the
research results may be negligible.
All of these uncertainties make
research investments highly risky.
Given the high level of risk that
is associated with research related
investments, a firm would like to
diversify away some of this risk. A
RJV will enable a firm to spread
risk among the venture participants and thus lower .the average
risk that a firm will face. As a
result, the joint venture should
provide more efficient investments
because a participant will be able
to make additional investments
that now have a net present value
given the firm's lower average risk.

A RJV will enable a firm to
spread risk among the
venture participants and
thus lower the average risk
that a firm will face.
However, the magnitude of the
gains from diversification that
would result from a RJV is uncertain. Unlike some of the other
efficiency gains, firms can generally diversify their investments individually in the market or through
their shareholders. In other words,
an individual firm should be able
to achieve this benefit without having to participate in a joint venture. However, if a market failure
prevents the firms from diversifying independently, then firms
would be able to realize a gain to
efficiency from diversification
through participating in a joint
venture.
3. Dissemination of the research
results
Because research results are likely to be considered public goods or
quasi-public goods, social welfare
is increased by the dissemination
of the results. A public good is a
good or service whose benefits are
not reduced by an additional user
and for which it is generally difficult to exclude people from its
benefit, even if they are unwilling
to pay for it. The paradigm public
good is information.
The product of a RJV, especially
one set up to perform basic research, is most likely information.

Information tends to have the attributes of a public good, in that,
"the use of information by one
party does not exclude simultaneous use by others at no further
cost."" 5 Because others can benefit
by using the information without
increasing the cost of obtaining the
information "economic efficiency
calls for widespread use of R & D
results."' 6 As a result, broadly disseminated information will increase society's benefit, even if the
information is given to the researching firm's competitors.
However, a firm will have no
incentive to disseminate the information from research because of
free rider problems. The patent
system, which aims at encouraging
a firm to share its information with
other firms, fails to achieve this
goal because the firm does not
receive appropriate compensation.
Difficulties in both monitoring
and price discrimination prevent a
patent owner from receiving adequate compensation.' 7 As a result,
the information will not receive
the wide dispersal that society desires.
A RJV increases the incentive to
disseminate information by at least
guaranteeing that venture participants, who have all paid for the
research costs, will share the information. In addition, downstream
competition is increased when the
firms share these innovations. As a
result, the consumer receives the
benefit of increased competition in
the form of lower prices.
The existence of increased efficiency is directly tied to the goal of
the joint venture enterprise. A
joint venture that seeks to produce
information about the safe preproduction disposal of hazardous
waste would create a product with
the characteristics of a public
good.' 8 The gains from this type of
venture will not be present in a
conventional joint venture where
the end product is a tangible good;
tangible goods do not usually possess the characteristics of a public
good.
B. Competitive Losses
Despite the potential gains to
efficiency, a research joint venture
may also reduce competition.
(continued on page 20)
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There are two types of competitive
losses associated with RJVs: (1)
anti-competitive effects in the research market; and (2) anti-competitive effects in the product market.
1. Anti-competitive effects in the
research market
A RJV may cause two different
types of anti-competitive effects in
the research market. First, the total
amount of innovation produced by
the RJV may be lower than non-cooperative conditions would produce. Second, the level of competition in the research market may be
less in a joint venture than in a
non-joint venture scheme.
a. Incentive to reduce total research
performed
A RJV may create an incentive
for the venture participants to reduce the total amount of research
undertaken by the venture. Ironically, a RJV not only provides the
firms with the opportunity to collude to slow the pace of R & D, but
the very dynamics of a joint venture may create additional incentives to reduce the amount of R &
D. Because a firm may realize

lower costs because of its participation in a RJV, these lower costs will
create lost profits for the firm's
competitors. As a result, each of
the participant firms may end up
in a better economic position if the

total amount of research in the
RJV is decreased. Because the
firms are collectively setting their
research policy in the joint venture, the firms may choose a level
of investment that maximizes profits for the participating firms.
However, this level of investment
may be socially sub-optimal given
the decreasing costs that result
from greater efficiency.
There are several factors that
affect the strength of the incentive
to slow the pace of innovation,
including the scope and the duration of the joint venture. A RJV
with narrowly defined goals and
with a limited project duration will
provide less opportunity for the
type of collusion that would slow
the pace of innovation. 19 Con20

versely, a RJV with broader and
less-well defined goals and with a
longer project duration will provide greater opportunities for collusion.20
In addition, the incentive created by the joint venture to slow the
pace of technology is strongly influenced by the ability of the venture participants to conduct independent research. If the venture
agreement does not prohibit the
participants from conducting independent research and the participants have resources available to
conduct independent research, the
potential for this anti-competitive
effect becomes negligible. As in
any cartel scenario, each participant would have "both the incentive and the means to 'cheat' on
any collusive scheme, and any restrictions on R & D competition
introduced as part of a RJV agreement would be difficult for the
participants to enforce." 21 Therefore, it is expected that firms will
only collude to slow the pace of
innovation in cases where there are
restraints in the agreement that
prohibit independent research. Absent such restraints, the incentive
for the participants to cheat on one
another should outweigh any potential anti-competitive effects.
b. Decreased competition in the
research market
A RJV may decrease competition in the research market. While
the RJV increases the dissemination of information among the
venture participants, the overall
competition between all firms in
an industry may decrease because
the venture participants may be
less likely to grant licenses to nonventure firms. This result is referred to as "static inefficiency in
the R & D market," that is, "for
any given level of know-how, the
fewer the independent entities
competing to sell this knowledge,
the higher the price is likely to
be." 2 2 If the venture firms are able
to restrict the dissemination of
information to only venture members, the result may be higher
downstream prices than would
have been present absent the RJV.
This result is analogous to the
effect of monopoly pricing in the
product market.

The size of the joint venture is
pivotal in determining the net effect on competition. Large joint
ventures have less incentive to sell
the knowledge gained through the
joint venture than do smaller joint
ventures.3 On the other hand,
large ventures will be granting
more licenses to use the information because there are more participants within the venture. While
the net effect may be that the RJV
results in less dissemination of
information than non-cooperative
research, it is difficult to predict
the actual effect without looking at
a specific RJV. It appears, however, that a very small or very large
RJV should result in the greatest
dissemination of information.
IV. Determining Whether a Joint
Venture Is Socially Beneficial
A. The Role Of The Tort System
On A Firm's Decision To Invest In
Safety Innovations
The tort system is a set of legal
rules that allocate the costs of
accidents and injuries among various participants. In the area of
product-related accidents, these
participants include the producer
of the product, the distributor of
the product and the user of the
product, the consumer. The tort
system determines which participants will be held liable and the
costs that each participant will
have to pay for a particular accident. Because the tort system imposes costs on participants for
their actions, the tort system will
affect the participants' behavior.
In particular, the imposition of
liability on the firm producing the
product involved in the accident
will affect how much of the product the firm produces.
Many scholars have described in
great length how a liability scheme
will influence the behavior of a
firm, including the firm's decision
to invest in safety innovation. 24 A
firm will invest in safety innovations to the point where the costs of
the investment are equal to the
savings to the firm from reduced
accident costs. The savings to the
firm from reducing the costs of
accidents are determined by the
particular liability rule - strict
liability or negligence - that will
Volume 4 Number I/Fall, 1991
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be applied in assessing costs for the
firm's actions.
Under a strict liability scheme,
"injurers must pay for all accident
losses that they cause. Hence injurers' total costs will be the social
goal of minimizing total accident
costs. Consequently, injurers will
be induced to choose the socially
optimal level of due care.""25 No
other inducements are necessary to
equate the private benefit with the
social benefit. Therefore, under a
strict liability scheme, a firm
should be engaged in the socially
optimal level of safety innovation.
However, under a negligence
scheme "an injurer will be held
liable for accident losses he causes

Under a strict liability scheme,
a firm should be engaged in
the socially optimal level of
safety innovation.
only if he was negligent, that is,
only if his level of care was less
than a level specified by the courts,
called due care."' 26 Under a negligence scheme, the firm's investment in safety innovation would
equal the socially desirable level
only if the court 27 has defined due
care to be the same as the optimal
level of care. If the court defines
due care to be something less than
the optimal level of care, additional incentives will be necessary to
induce the- firm to invest at the
socially optimal level.
Under both the strict liability
and negligence schemes, the
amount of investment in safety
innovation is directly tied to the
existence and operation of the liability system. The firm will invest
in safety innovation to the point
where the benefit of investing, including the reduction in accident
costs, equals the cost of investing.
However, the level of investment
in safety innovation is not necessarily the same under both
schemes. Instead, the level of investment in safety innovations will
be the same under the two schemes
only if the courts accurately define
due care to be the socially optimal
level of care.

Volume 4 Number /Fall, 1991

B. Effect Of Liability Rules On The
Variables Used In A Social Welfare
Calculation
Several models have been developed to assess the social desirability of RJVs.2 8 These models place
much emphasis on what the venture participants would do absent
the joint venture. However, in
making this determination none of
the models, require the analyst to
look at the effect of the liability
rules on the venture participants'
actions. Yet, as the previous section illustrated, a firm's decision
on the level of safety innovation is
directly tied to the particular liability rule in place. The existence of
the tort system will affect the models that scholars have developed to
analyze the social desirability of
RJVs.
The key element in all the models is the investment decision of
the venture participants absent the
RJV. This element incorporates

The existence of the tort
system will affect the models
that scholars have developed
to analyze the social
desirability of RJVs.
two factors: (1) whether the firms
will even invest in safety innovation absent the joint venture; and
(2) at what speed will the joint
venture innovate. These factors
reflect the efficiency and anti-competitive concerns discussed in Section III of this Article. Both of
these factors are affected directly
by the particular tort scheme in
place.
The decision of whether to invest in safety innovations will be
determined by a cost-benefit analysis. The costs and benefits of a
given safety innovation investment, however, will change depending on the tort scheme in
effect. If the venture participants
believe they will be subject to a
strict liability scheme, each firm
will choose to invest in the level of
safety innovation that is optimal
for the firm absent the RJV, given
its particular cost structures. However, it should be noted that this
level of research may not be the

socially optimal level of research,
but instead is the least inefficient
level without a RJV. Yet, when a
RJV is involved, the same level of
research may occur at even lower
costs or a higher level of research
may occur at the same cost. Accordingly, the level of research that
results from being subjected to the
strict liability scheme may not ultimately result in the socially optimal level of research if conducted
in a non-cooperative setting.
Under a negligence scheme, in
which a firm could be found not
liable even though it failed to invest in a sufficient amount of safety innovation, a firm would have
little or no incentive to engage in
any safety innovation absent a
RJV. Moreover, there is no reason
to believe that firms would engage
in the same level of research absent
the RJV unless the firms believe
that courts accurately set the level
of due care at the socially optimal
level. Even if courts attempt to set
the level of due care at the socially
optimal level, there is no reason to
believe that the courts would consider the benefits of joint research
in setting that level of due care.
Therefore, firms operating under a
negligence scheme would not have
the incentive to invest at the level
of research that would be socially
optimal given a RJV.

Even if courts attempt to set
the level of due care at the
socially optimal level, there is
no reason to believe that the
courts would consider the
benefits of joint research in
setting that level of due care.
Furthermore, it may be possible
that in a given RJV the participants will have different beliefs
about which particular liability
rule will apply to them. This scenario is possible because: (1) different types of firms are treated differently under current law; and (2)
a RJV in the hazardous waste area
could easily consist of different
types of firms, including manufacturers, disposers, and intermediaries. If the firms have different
(continued on page 22)
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beliefs about which liability
scheme is applicable, then their
individual decisions concerning
the appropriate level of research
will differ. This difference will affect the overall models that analyze
social desirability absent a RJV by
providing varying inputs due to the
tort system.
The existence of a tort system
also affects the degree to which a
joint venture will result in a slowing of the pace of innovation 29
because the incentives that would
lead joint venture participants to
collude and slow the pace of innovation are directly tied to the liability rule in place. The analysis of the
degree of collusion that will occur
because of decreased profits to
other firms from a RJV is inaccurate if the effect of the tort system
is not taken into account. While
firms may have an incentive to
slow the pace of innovation to
recoup some of the lost profit,
there is a counterbalancing incentive, at least under a strict liability
scheme.
The existence of a tort system
affects the degree to which
a joint venture will result
in a slowing of the pace
of innovation.
Under a strict liability scheme, a
firm is given the incentive to invest
in all safety innovations where the
benefits outweigh the costs. The
decreased profits can be seen as
one element of the cost variable in
this cost-benefit analysis. This decrease in profits will need to be
balanced against the benefits
which include the reduced accident
costs that a firm will realize from
investing in a particular safety innovation. Thus, the incentive to
slow the pace of research is reduced, if not eliminated, when
firms face a strict liability scheme.
The effects under a negligence
scheme are not as clear. A firm will
only realize a benefit from the
safety innovation, that is, reducing
the costs of accidents, if courts
22

incorporate that investment as part
of the definition of due care. If
courts do include that safety investment as a necessary condition
for non-negligence, then the same
counterbalancing incentive discussed for strict liability will result.
If courts do not include that safety
investment as a necessary condition for non-negligence, then firms
will have no incentive to engage in
the investment and moreover, may
be placed at a disadvantage by
investing.
Under a negligence scheme,
firms may be more reluctant to
enter into a RJV because of a
potential increase in liability. The
RJV and its results may suggest to
courts that a company did have
opportunities to improve safety. If
courts incorporate this possibility
into the negligence calculation,

Under a negligence scheme,
firms may be more reluctant
to enter into a RJV because of
a potential increase in liability.
firms may be exposed to a liability
risk that would not have been
present absent the RJV. The additional exposure to liability may
induce firms to limit the research
of the joint venture or to avoid
entering into a RJV altogether.
Overall, there appears to be little
or no reason to be concerned about
the incentive to slow the pace of
innovation that results from a RJV
under a strict liability regime.
However, under a negligence
scheme, the firm may find it desirable to slow the pace of innovation
because of exposure to increased
liability.
V. Conclusion
Encouragement of research for
the proper and safe disposal of
hazardous waste will benefit consumers. The present social welfare
models that calculate whether a
research joint venture would result
in the socially optimal level of
research innovation fail to incorporate the tort liability system. A
given liability scheme affects the
social welfare calculation of a RJV
devoted to safety innovations. Further research would help ascertain
how the tort system directly affects

social welfare economic analysis.
Only further study will determine
whether the current models can be
adjusted to reflect the role of the
liability rules. Perhaps the traditional models will need to be replaced with a different type of
analysis that incorporates the effects of the tort system on the
decision to invest in safety innovations. Either way, the effect of the
tort system must be included in the
future analysis of RJVs.
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